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ABSTRACT
This paper presents and applies an integrated framework to assess the
consistency between fiscal deficits and other macroeconomic targets,such as
output growth and the rate of inflation. The model centersaround the
government budget constraint and can be used to either derivethe financeable
deficit given inflation targets, or to derive an equilibrium inflation rate
for which no fiscal adjustment would be necessary. The financeable deficit is
defined as the deficit that does not require more financing than is compatible
with sustainable external and internal borrowing, and existing targets for
inflation and output growth. The model can assess the impact on the relation
between fiscal adjustment and sustainable inflation rates of financial sector
reforms affecting base money demand, of changes in interest rates paid on
foreign and domestic public sector debt, of output growth targets and of
exchange rate policy. The analysis furthermore incorporates an approach, due
to Cohen (1986),to the derivation of a sustainable external debt policy.
Finally, the model can also be used to see what happens if the required fiscal
adjustment is postponed. We explore two alternatives: one where fiscal
adjustment takes place eventually, and one where the inflation tax is used
eventually to close any financing gap. The model is applied to an analysis of
inflation, external debt and financial sector reform in Turkey.
Ritu Anand Sweder van Wijnbergen
Finance Commission, World Bank
Government of India 1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 203333
1 Introduction
This paper presents and applies an integrated framework to assessthe
consistency between fiscal deficits and other macroeconomic targets,in
particular output growth and the rate of inflation.The model centers around
the government budget constraint and can be used to eitherderive the
"financeable" deficit given inflation targets, or to derive an equilibrium
inflation rate for which no fiscal adjustment would be necessary.The
financeable deficit is defined as the deficit that does not require more
financing than is compatible with sustainable external andinternal borrowing,
and existing targets for inflation and output growth. The model can assessthe
impact of financial sector reforms affecting base money demand,of changes in
interest rates paid on foreign and domestic public sector debt,of output
growth targets and of exchange rate policy on therelation between fiscal
adjustment and sustainable inflation rates. The analysis furthermore
incorporates an approach, due to Daniel Cohen (1985,1986), to the derivation
of a sustainable external debt policy. Finally, the model can also be used to
see what happens if the required fiscal adjustment is postponed.We explore
two alternatives: one where fiscal adjustment takes place eventually,and one
where the inflation tax is used eventually to close any financing gap once
debt issue is discontinued. The model is applied to an analysis of inflation,
external debt and financial sector reform in Turkey.
The framework is based on the public finance approach to inflation.In
this approach (seePhelps (1973),Dornbusch (1977),and Buiter (1983,
1985), among others), inflation is interpreted as the residual tax.Residual
because it restores balance between the expenditure plans ofthe public
sector, its debt management and revenues from traditional sourcesof taxation.4
Inflation acts as a tax because it forces the private sectorto reduce
expenditure just to maintain the real value of moneybalances it desires to
hold for a given rate-of-return structure. It drives a wedgebetween income
and expenditure not offset by any real accumulation of assets, justlike any
other tax does. Also, since its counterpart is Central sankadvances to the
public sector, it allows the public sector to cover amatching excess of
expenditure over more traditional sources of revenue.
This approach does not deny the fact that, in the short n,demand
pressure or cost-push factors such asnominal exchange rate changes may be
more important determinants of inflation. However,such factors contribute
little to the understanding of sustained inflation. Excess demand pressure, as
Friedman points out in his celebrated presidential address (Friedman(
1968)),should lead to accelerating rather than sustained inflation. Cost-push
factors such as wage or exchange rate changes can explain price levelshifts
but not really sustained inflation. Of course continued nominaldevaluation
could explain a matching excess of domestic over foreign inflation, but such
an explanation begs the question of what is behind the apparentneed to resort
to such a continued policy of nominal devaluation? A similar objection canbe
raised against strict monetarist explanations of inflation. The claimthat
sustained inflation is not possible without a matching growth in nominal
balances is almost tautologically true since otherwise the real moneystock
would go off towards zero or infinity. It however begs the question of what
drives such a process of sustained monetization.
To explain sustained inflation rates, an analysis of the fiscal
implications of sustained inflation is necessary, and thisis what the fiscal
approach to inflation does. This approach has receivedrenewed attention after
an influential paper by Sargent and Wallace ( 1982),whoused this view on5
inflation to explain paradoxical links betweeninflation and money growth
sometimes observed in practice. The concept of sustainabilityplays an
important role in their analysis. Sustainabilityof inflation targets requires
consistency between those inflation targets and theiri'clied consequences for
revenues from the inflation tax on the one hand,and on the other hand the
public sector's surplus of expenditure overother sources of revenues. This
analysis has been extended to the open economy so asto allow discussion of
exchange rate policy in Drazen and Helpman (1987)and van Wijnbergen (1986).
It is arguable that the exchange rate policy followed in manymoderate
and high inflation countries has increased the relevanceof the public finance
approach to inflation. Moderate and high inflationhas forced many countries
to offset inflation differentials with trading partners bynominal devaluation
to avoid disruption of real trade flows. However, such a policyeliminates the
role of the exchange rate as a "nominal" anchor since any blip inthe price
level will be offset automatically by a matching exchange rate adjustment.If
in addition monetary policy is accommodating through theCentral Bank's
inability to resist monetization of fiscal deficits, no monetaryanchors are
left. In su& circumstances the public finance approach to inflation might
even become relevant for the explanation of short run inflation,not just for
medium trends.
But even if a fixed exchange rate regime is adhered to, the approach
suggested here is relevant. A fixed exchange rate regime (or, more generally,
a predetermined exchange rate regime) implies a medium terminflation rate:
foreign inflation plus the rate of nominal devaluationembedded in the
exchange rate regime (zeroif it is a truly fixed regime). Consistency
between the inflation rate implied by the exchange rate policyfollowed and
fiscal policy is important. Empirical evidence shows conclusivelythat the6
absence of such consistency is an important determinant of lack of credibility
and the eventual collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime (Cumb-yand van
Wijnbergen (1987)).Hence the approach sugggested in this paper could be used
to assess sustainability of a fixed exchange rate regime.
In what follows we first present the analytical framework that underlies
the model. We then provide the empirical analysis necessary before the model
can be applied. This analysis and the associated data requirements are greatly
simplified by insisting on consistency rather than on optimality. We then
proceed to apply the framework to an analysis of external debt, financial
sector reform, inflation and fiscal policy in Turkey.
2 Analytical Framework
2.1 Fiscal Deficits, Money Creation and Debt.
This Section explores the link between fiscal deficits, money creation
and debt. First, the analysis focuses on the precise measurement of the public
sector's net claim on real resources (the"real" or "operational" deficit),
and on the ways it can be financed. Then the implications for feasible
financing of given macroeconomic targets for inflation and output growth, of
changes in financial sector regulatory policies and of interest rates abroad
and at home are explored.
To derive the relation between fiscal deficits, money creation and debt,
start from the following relation:
(la) D+i +i*B*E_B+B*E+DCg7
—B+ (B* -nfa)E+ DCg + nfaE
The left hand side of (1) lists the expenses (net of taxes) of the public
sector: its non-interest deficit D plus nominal interest payments on domestic
and foreign debt. j (j*) is the nominal interest rate on domestic (foreign)
debt B (B*). E is the nominal exchange rate (TL per dollar). These expenses
need to be covered by the issue of domestic or foreign debt (B andB*), plus
Central Bank advances to the public sector, DC .Thenon-interest deficit D
g
and the interest payments should include the non-interest deficit and interest
obligations of all government entities: the central government, state
enterprises, municipalities, local governments, and extra-budgetary funds. The
proper treatment of the Central Bank is discussed below; its obligationstoo
should be included.
The second line of equation (1) regroups the sources of financing
somewhat, to bring out the linkbetweenmoney financing and public sector
deficits. Increases in base money, M, equal the increase in net domestic
credit to the government, DC, and increases in net foreign assets of the
Central Bank, nfa E, minus the increase in the Central Bank's net worth.
Therefore base money can be seen as a source of revenue to the government.
This analysis also suggests the proper definition of money for an analysis of
deficit finance. Clearly, revenue derived from inflationary erosion of the
private sector's deposits that is offset by inflationary erosion of loans
outstanding to the private sector does not increase NET revenue. Hence the
need to use base money or "inside money" only (SeeAnand and van Wijnbergen (
1987)on how to deal with such real world complications as Central Bank's8
credit to the private sector and so on). Reserve or base money equals currency
in circulation and ( net) reserves held by commercialbanks at the Central
Bank. These components form the net liabilities of the Central Banktowards
the private sector. However, counting all of the Central Bank'sliabilities
(base money) as a public sector liability means thatof the Central Bank's
assets, the claims on non-government agents need to besubtracted from the
public sector's debt. In particular, the public sector's foreigndebt needs to
be measured NET of the Central Bank's foreign assets (i.e. public sector
foreign debt equals B*nfa*).
If in addition the Central Bank's profit and loss account is included
into the definition of the public sector, the link between deficits and money
financing becomes watertight. In a simplified set-up, the CentralBank's
profits consist of interest earnings on reserves,i*nfa*, with as counterpart
an increase in net worth:i*nfa*E —NW.Subtracting that simple expression
from the budget identity yields:




The importance of the latter correction cannot be stressed enough.
Examples are rife where countries run a balanced budget, sometimes underthe
force of a constitutional amendment, but in fact continue deficit spending by
effectively shifting Treasury expenditure to the Central Bank. In Turkey, a
substantial part of the interest payments on the Central Government's foreign
debt is handled by the Central Bank, without being recorded in the Central9
Government's budget. Further modifications to (1) are necessary
to tighten the link between the public sector'snet claim on resources to
increases in the real value of domestic and foreign debt, toinflation and to
money creation. The most important oneinvolves incorporating:
capital losses due to inflation and exchange rate changesinto the accounting
framework
Making this correction to equ. (1) results inthe following link between
deficits and inflation (see Anand and van Wijnbergen (1987)for a more
detailed analysis of the steps involved):
***
. *.*
( 2) d +rb+(r+e)(b -nfa )e —b+((b-nfa )e) +M/P
*•*
•
— b+((b-nfa )e) +m+Pm1
Lower case letters denote real variables, so d —D/P,the real value of the
non-interest deficit; p (p*) is the domestic (foreign) price level.p (p*) is
the corresponding domestic (foreign) inflation rates.b (b*)is the real
value of domestic (foreign)debt in terms of domestic (foreign)goods, and m
* isthe real money stock. nfa is the real value of the banking system'snet
*
foreignassets in terms of foreign goods. r (r)isthe real rate of
'** * *
interest:r —i-F,r —i -P .eis the real exchange rate, e —EP/P. e
is the rate of depreciation of the real exchange rate. M isthe nominal, and m
the real money stock: m —M/P.A ". " indicateschanges in the variable below
'We use the following identity in the derivation of (2):
*•*•* .*
.•'**
((b-nfa )e) —(b-nfa )e +e(b-nfa )e10
it. Finally, n denotes the real growth rate of the economy.
Equ (2) states that the fiscal deficit, inclusive of the Central Bank's
profit and loss account, but counting REAL interest payments only, equals
changes in the real value of domestic and foreign debt, plus revenue from the
inflation tax (Pm)and from seignorage (run).The sum of the latter two equal
revenue from monetization, M/P. Outside steady state there could be other
sources of revenue from monetization than these two: once-off changes in the
real money stock because of changes in inflation or interest rates, or similar
once-off changes due to financial innovations shifting money demand.
Equation (2) as it stands is nothing but accounting, but it is at the
basis of most of the analysis to come. Macroeconomic variables such as growth
and inflation have implications for the amount of money the private sector is
willing to absorb for given interest rates. Similarly, changes in financial
structure and regulation will also have an impact on the amount of revenue
from monetization that can be expected. Finally, creditworthiness and
sustainability imply constraints on the issue of interest bearing debt. All
such restrictions can be incorporated in equ. (2). In the next two Sections,
we consider first monetization and then debt issue. The next Section then puts
it all together to derive the constraints on fiscal policy that consistency
with financial structure and macroeconomic targets implies.
2.2 Revenue from Monetization and the Structure of the Financial Sector.
The previous section argued that the appropriate money concept to use is
net Central Bank liabilities to the private sector, or reserve money. It is
thus important to understand how demand for base money responds to changes in11
financial sector regulation, to interest rates andinflation and so on. This
creates a practical problem in that thoseliabilities are towards different
agents in the economy. It istherefore unlikely that an aggregate money demand
function would adequately capture the sensitivityof reserve money demand with
respect to changes in the inflation rate,financial structure and interest
rates. We use a more structural approachin this paper.Underlying this
approach is a model describing private portfoliochoice as a function of
inflation, output growth and interest rates. This givesthe amount of
currency, demand deposits and time depositsthe private sector is willing to
hold given output, inflation and interest rates.This is coupled with a
simple financial sector model incorporating reserve requirementsand other
bank regulatory policies to derive the demand for reserves bycommercial
banks. The demand for reserves is then added to thedemand for currency
already derived to get an estimate of the totaldemand for base money given
inflation, interest rates and so on.All this is then used to calculate
revenue from monetization for different inflation rates, outputgrowth rates,
interest and inflation rates and different regulatory policies.
This indirect, structural approach has a number of advantages.It allows
explicit calculation of the effects of changes infinancial sector regulation
on the financeable deficit through the impactof such regulation on the
aggregate demand for base money. For the same reason,this approach is more
likely to be stable across changes in financial sector regulation.Below we
give an example for a simple fractional reserve banking system(iea system
where banks are required to hold a fraction of their deposits asreserves).
More complicated regulatory systems are incorporated as an optionin the LOTUS
model that is available on diskette as a companion to this paper.
To analyse the determinants of the demand for the primary componentsof12
reserve money entering into such a financial sector model, considerfirst a




Demand for currency C, demand deposits DD, and time deposits TD, all as a
share of nominal GNP (PY in the formula), depend on inflation P, and the
interest rates paid on demand and time deposits, DD and More
sophisticated financial structures would introduce additional factors. For
example, with foreign exchange deposits available one would expect exchange
rate depreciation and foreign interest rates to influence demand for domestic
assets. However the time period since the introduction of foreign exchange
deposits has been too short to allow econometric analysis of the influence of
such factors.
Under a fractional reserve system, with reserve requirement ratios RRDD






(4) can be used to derive the impact of changes in inflation, interest rates
and financial sector regulation on base money demand and their likely impact
on the revenue the public sector can expect from monetization. Combining this
information with equ. (2) then allows assessment of the fiscal consequences of
inflation and of financial sector reforms affecting for example reserve
requirements R%D and RR,0 or the interest rates paid on deposits.
2.3 Creditworthiness and the limits on foreign debt issue
The cost and availability of foreign financing are clearly important
determinants of what constitutes a consistent fiscal policy. Required
***
financingdepends on the cost of the existing foreign debt, r (b -nfa )e; in
addition, for any total revenue requirement, the amount to be covered from
domestic sources depends on the amount of foreign financing (b*.nfa)e that is
desired, or, if less, available.
Assessing a country's room for external borrowing involves two
considerations: solvency and creditworthiness. Solvency concerns ability to
pay and is intricately linked to the non-interest current account, real
interest and output growth rates, and, of course, the initial level of debt.
Solvency is assumed to be in jeopardy if the discounted value of an estimate
of minimum current and future consumption levels exceeds current wealth net of
foreign debt. In practice, one would calculate the discounted value of current
and future feasible trade surpluses and compare that value with the current
debt; these two approaches are in fact equivalent. Cohen (1985) assesses the
solvency of the major debtor countries and concludes that in almost none of
them solvency is at all at risk.14
Creditworthiness may however be a constraint even if solvency is not.
Creditworthiness depends on the lenders' perception of a country's ability AND
willingnessto pay. Therefore creditworthiness often imposes tighter
constraints than solvency alone. Assessing the precise limits imposed by
creditworthiness constraints is difficult for several reasons. First of all,
it is extremely difficult to assess the costs of default. Cohen (1986)
suggests a simple approach to this problem, by observing that,if a country
has not defaulted yet, the current debt service burden must fall short of
whatever the cost of default is. An obvious definition of a "prudent" debt
strategy then is any borrowing path that will not, at any time, raise thedebt
service burden above its current value. This may sound almost tautologically
true, but it has important implications. For example the trade surpluses that
many Latin American countries had to runafter1982 in fact do not qualify
under this approach. Clearly, being forced to run trade surpluses of around 8%
of CNP raises the burden associated with the current level of external debt
and so might trigger default.
A second problem is the definition of the debt burden. Repayment not only
requires a sufficiently high value of wealth to be able to pay, but also the
generation of a surplus of traded goods production over traded goods
consumption (net exports). This is likely to be much more burdensome in a
country with most of its resources in the non-traded sectors of the economy
than in an outward oriented economy. But if it is more burdensome, a country
might be more tempted not to repay, even if solvency requirements are met.
Hence theimportance of debt-export ratiosinthe assessment of
creditworthiness. But while debt-export ratios are important, they are a
biased estimate of the ratio of a country's debt to its output of tradeable
goods. Some domestically produced traded goods are likely to be sold at home.15
On the other hand, the debt-output ratiowould be an underestimate, since GNP
incorporates non-traded goods. Wetherefore use a weighted average of the
debt-output ratio and the debt-export ratio:
** *
(5) R —'yX + (1-1)Y
with X (y*)the value of exports (homeoutput) expressed in terms of
* *
foreigngoods: X —X/e(Y—Y/e).
For the choice of the weights we follow an approachsuggested by Cohen
(1986). Cohen suggests weights constructed insuch a way that no incentive to
drive a wedge between actual and social costs of foreign exchangeremains, at
least for the purpose of assessing creditworthiness.The measure of resources
R* should thus be set up such that any improvement in the debt output ratio as
a consequence of a real appreciation willbe just offset by the negative
impact on the debt-export ratio. The issuethen is how to choose -y.Choosing
*
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( isthe elasticity of X (y*)with respect to the real exchange16
rate e (theempirical implementation of the model presented here allows for
different choices of -y).
Afeasible external debt strategy that maintains creditworthiness at
least at current levels then consists of a time path for foreign borrowing
that viii not include a rise in For later convenience we define the
*
growthrate of R ,nR:
(l-7)n,
(8) nR ________+ ________
+ (1-))(y+ (l-y))
* *
Notethat R has been constructed such that R is insensitive to real
depreciation. n, isthe growth rate of exports (CNP),both expressed
in terms of foreign goods. n, can in turn be linked to output growth in the





€,.isthe elasticity of X ,Turkey'sexports in constant "dollars",
with respect to output in the countries Turkey is exporting to.
Combining all this leads to the following expression for feasible
* externaldebt accumulation as a percentage of GNP, e(b -nfa )/y
(10) e(bnfa*)—e(b*
-nfa*)
Equations (8-10) allow empirical application once the various elasticities
have been estimated. Econometric estimates of these elasticities and of the17
parameters of the asset demand functions are presented in Section 3.
2.4 Putting it all together: on the design of consistent fiscal policies
We define a consistent fiscal policy as a policy that can be sustained
over the medium term withc.. compromising any other macroeconomic target and
without reliance on unsustainable debt finance. Unsustainable debt finance
implies debt issue at a rate in excess of the growth rate of the resources
available for eventual debt service. This is in fact a more stringent
requirement than solvency if the real interest rate exceeds the real growth
rate of the economy.
If we take R* as the resource base concept for foreign debt, and domestic
output y as the resource base for domestic debt, we obtain the following
restrictions on debt issue:
(11) b —nb,b* -nfa—n(b*
-nfa*)
n ( isthe growth rate of y (R*).Inserting these restrictions on debt
issue into equ. (2), and expressing variables as percentages of GNP then
yields the following ezpression for the deficit reduction required for
consistency, RDR:
(12) RDR—+ r+r*(*-na*)e)-(n+($**)++ P}
A "—"abovea variable indicates the variable is expressed as a share of GNP.
RDR equals the actual deficit inclusive of real interest payments on foreign18
_*_*
anddomestic debt, minus the financeable deficit, (nb + nR(b -nfa ) + fin +
Pm). A deficit reduction equal to RDR will bring fiscal deficitsin line with
other macroeconomic targets in the sense defined before.
Alternatively, (12) can be used to calculate "sustainable" inflation
rates. In that case one simply equates RDR to the actual deficit, andsolves
for the inflation rate that restores equality 2• Such an exercise faces a
problem of multiple solutions if the functional formof the asset demand
functions implies a dependence of the interest elasticity on inflation or
nominal interest rates. An example where this occurs is the semi-logarithmic
equation. This problem need not concern us here since it clearlydoes not
arise if (12) is used, as is done in this paper, to derive a sustainable
deficit for given inflation targets rather than the other way around.
Note that if is used as the benchmark against which to measure foreign
A
debtaccumulation, real depreciation (e>O) does NOT affect fiscal balance:
higher debt servicing costs are just offset by additional foreign borrowing
under such a rule. ut this will not be the case if either exports or output
are chosen as benchmark. If the debt-output ratio is used as a benchmark, (12)
becomes:
(13) RDR —(a +r + (r* + e)(* -n?a*)e)
— _** — - (nb+n(b-n?a)+flm+PIfl)
Clearly, under a debt-output rule, a real depreciation (e>O) increases the
RDR, ie reduces the room for fiscal expansion.
2See Melnick and Sokoler (1984) for an exercise along such lines.19
Under a debt-export rule, (12) becomes:
*' _*_*
(14) RDR— (d+rb+(r+e)(b-rifa)e}
-- + + n+P}
— —*_* _* —x* *_* _*
— (d+rb+r(b
-nfa)e) (nb + n(b -nfa )
x* _*
+ (n+P)m)+( 1- )e(b
-nfa)e
Under this rule, real depreciation willrelax the fiscal adjustment
requirement if the export elasticity with respectto the real exchange rate
exceeds one.
3 Emvirical Preliminaries
Some empirical work is needed before the model set upin Section 2
can actually be implemented. First, the assetdemand functions that form the
input into the financial sector model need tobe estimated. Section 3.1
presents the results for Turkey. Second, the exportelasticities with respect
to price and income in recipient countries areneeded for the derivation of
the resource measure used in the external debt part. These are presentedin
Section 3.2
3.1 The Structure of Money Demand in Turkey
Reserve money consists of currency in circulation and reservesheld
against demand deposits and time deposits. Toderive demand for base money we
therefore estimate asset demand functions describing the privatesector's20
portfolio choice over currency, demand deposits and time deposits as a
function of inflation, income and interest rates. Consider demand for currency
first.
(15) log(C/CPI) —3.58+O.S7log(y)°69TD,t -LO7iDD,t
(3.10) (2.42) (3.67) (3.01)
-1.51 +0.28log(C1/CPI1)
(3.79) (1.77)
R2—0.83 DW—2.08 Sample Period:1977.I-1986.IV
The results are reasonable, with all the coefficients of the right sign and
almost all highly significantly different from zero. Seasonal dummies were
also included but their coefficients are not reported here. Adjustment is
quick, with a mean lag of less than 5 months (1/(1-0.28) quarter).
A similar equation for demand deposits yields the following results:
(16) log(DD/CPI) —8.90-0.55log(y) -0.96TD,t +0.60
(6.71) (2.86) (7.97) (1.30)
-.2.16 +0.241og(DD1/CPI1)
(7.83) (2.67)
R2—o.98 DW—1.85 Sample Period:1977.I-1986.IV
Again a reasonable equation, with a relatively high adjustment speed ar21
strong sensitivity to interest rates and expected inflation.
Applied to time deposits, the portfolio approach yields:
(17) log(TD/CPI) —1.30+0.28log(y) +1.18TDt +0.38
DD,t
(1.94) (1.02) (4.61) (1.21)
-1.41+0.68log(TD1/CPI1)
(2.41) (7.48)
R2—0.99 DW—l.90 Sample Period:1977.I-1986.IV
The equation shows strong sensitivity with respect to the own interest
rate tTDand to expected inflation. The coefficient of the interest paid on
demand deposits is insignificant, low and of the wrong sign. Reestimating the
equation excluding this variable yields:
(18) 1og(TD/CPI) —1.34+0.12log(y) +0:98TD,t -1.02
(1.98) (0.51) (5.04) (2.09)
+0.761og(TD1/CPI1)
(11.7)
R2—O.99 DW—1.90 Sample Period:1977.I-1986.IV
3.2 Export Demand Elasticities
Estimating demand elasticities of demand for Turkish exports runs into22
the practical problem that the composition of Turkish exports has changed a
great deal over the past few years. While total exports roseat an annual rate
of 29.4 percent in real terms, exports to the Gulf countries went up by 58.6%
over the same period. As a result, the share of exports going tothe Gulf
countries went up from 13.2 percent in 1980 to 36.4 percent in 1985. We
therefore decided to estimate separate demand equations for exports to the
Middle East and for exports to other countries.
Thenext problem isspecification.Thisinvolvesmorethan
technicalities. At issue is whether Turkey competes with local producers in
the markets it is exporting to or with other countries exporting to the same
market. In the first case, the relevant relative price variable is a measure
of Turkish export prices relative to a weighted average of say WPI indices in
the export markets covered by the equation (afterbringing the indices in a
common currency, of course). In the second case, comparison with import price
indices for imports into Turkey's export markets is more appropriate. In Anand
and van Wijnbergen (1988) we show that the second assumption is strongly
supported empirically. We therefore only report those results here.
Consider first the results for exports to the Gulf countries,




a2— 0.95DW —1.53Sample Period: 1969-198423
X°1 is the real value of Turkish exports to the Gulf countries expressed in
terms of foreign goods. RMOIL is the total import bill of those countries in
real terms. CMPRO is the relative price of Turkish exports in terms of the
aggregate import price index for those countries. The results show a very high
price elasticity of demand for Turkish exports and only a unit (long run)
elasticity with respect to all imports into the Gulf countries.
The results for exports to other countries, oc mostly the major OECD
countries) are qualitatively similar, although quite different quantitatively:
Px -
(20) log(XOC) —1.34+2.02log(M) +0.62log(MX)
(0.70) (2.28) (1.68)
R2—0.76 Sample Period: 1968-1984
is the dollar-based aggregate price index for imports into Turkey's export
markets. MXisthe corresponding real value of imports into those export
markets. If real income in Turkey's export markets is used instead of total






R2—0.76 Sample Period: 1968-198424
A final elasticity needed for the Cohen approach to external debt is the
supply elasticity of domestic real output with respect to the real exchange
rate (definedas the relative price of output in Turkey's trading partners
with respect to the price of Turkish goods). A simple regression yields:
(22) log(Y) —2.20-0.86log(e) +0.05TIME
(3.93) (3.24) (5.99)
This completes the empirical preliminaries. We now turn to the application of
the framework and empirical results.
4An Enmirical Alication: Deficits. Financial Sector Reform and
Inflation in Turkey.
In Section 4.1 we use the framework presented above to assess the
consistency of fiscal deficits with other macroeconomic targets for Turkey.
Section 4.2 discusses the consequences of postponing fiscal adjustment and
studies the interrelation between domestic debt issue, monetization and
current and future inflation We then use the model to assess the fiscal
impact of financial reforms in Section 4.3. Finally Section 4.4 looks at the
impact of the size and cost of foreign debtonthe budget, and the fiscal
implication of debt-substitution policies where external debt is in effect
"swapped" for internal debt.
4.1 Inflation and the Consistency of Fiscal Policy
The results are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. Underlying these tables are25
various targets and assumptions. First, a 6 percent real growth rate of GNP.
Second, the reserve requirements and nominal interest rates on demand and time
deposits prevailing at the end of 1987 are used. As to liquidity requirements,
only the part over which no interest is paid is included in the definition of
base money.
Table 1 assesses potential revenues from seignorage and the inflation tax
for various inflation rates. The table first lists demand for currency, demand
deposits and time deposits for various inflation rates; these asset demands
are derived usingthe empirical results of Section 3.1 and the model
presented in Section 2. These are then used to calculate demand for base money
as a function of reserve requirements and the liquidity ratio. In the next
column, inflation tax revenue is presented, while the final column lists total
revenie from monetization. Total demand for base money, the table shows, is
sensitive to inflation. It falls from 7.8% of GNP at 15% inflation to 5.9% at
60% itf1ation.It is clear from the next column that higher inflation leads
to higher revenue from inflation tax, be it at a declining rate. However, the
marginal increase in inflation tax revenue becomes less and less as inflation
rises; at 200% inflation (not shown in the table) inflation tax reaches its
maximum value.Total revenue from monetization also rises, although at a
slightly lower rate, because the second component, seignorage, actually
declines as inflation rises, This is a negligible effect, however.26
TABLE1:INFLATION TAXANDSEIGNORAGE AT VARIOUS INFLATION RATES
(percent of GNP)
Inflation Demand for: Inflation Monetization
Cash Deposits Tax Revenues
DemandTime
15 3.0 7.5 17.5 1.0 1.4
20 2.9 7.3 16.7 1.2 1.6
30 2.8 6.9 15.3 1.6 2.0
40 2.7 6.5 14.1 2.0 2.3
50 2.6 6.1 13.0 2.2 2.6
60 2.5 5.8 12.1 2.5 2.8
Thisanalysis covers one source of financing, monetization. In addition
there is domestic debt issue and foreign borrowing. The results of applying
the Cohen (1985,1987) approach to foreign borrowing to Turkey using the
empirical results of Section 2 are presented in Table 2. The table gives the
maximum increase in foreign debt that will just avoid an increase in the
debt-resource ratio for different growth rates at home and abroad. Under the
assumption of a 6% real output growth and 3.5%realoutput growth in trading
partners, the government can borrow 2.5% of GNPayear without jeopardizing
creditworthiness.
Furthermorewe assume that all the additional foreign exchange is
available to the government. This is probably reasonable, as not much private
sector foreign borrowing is expected other than inflows into the commercial
banking system through foreign exchange deposits owned by non-residents.
These are in any case better seen as remittances in disguise and should27
possibly be counted as above the line inflows rather than capital account
transactions.
TABLE 2: SUSTAINABLE CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICITS (percent of GNP)
Output Growth Output Growth Rates of Turkey's Trading Partners:
in Turkey : 0 1 2 3 3.5 4
3 1.12 1.21 1.29 1.38 1.42 1.46
4 1.49 1.58 1.66 1.75 1.79 1.83
5 1.87 1.95 2.04 2.12 2.17 2.21
6 2.24 2.33 2.41 2.5 2.54 2.58
7 2.61 2.70 2.78 2.87 2.91 2.95
For domestic debt we assume that debt issue is restricted to whatever is
compatible with maintaining the debt-output ratio constant.The reason for
not allowing a faster rate of domestic debt issue is the high real rate it
carries. At 12% a year it is well above the growth rate of the economy. At
this rate, debt-service costs would escalate as a percentage of GNP if more
extensive use is made of debt-issue to finance the deficit.
Table 3 shows, first of all, the financeable deficit as a function of the
inflation rate. It arrives at that measure by adding up the three sources of
financing: monetization, domestic debt issue and foreign borrowing. A target
inflation rate of 50%, close to the year-end-to-year-end inflation rate in
1987, allows a deficit of 6% of GNP. A target of 20% would allow a deficit of
4.8% only.28
TABLE3 FINANCEABLE DEFICIT FOR VARIOUS INFLATION TARGETS
(percent of GNP)
Inflation Financeable Actual Required
Rate Deficit DeficitDeficit
in 1986Reduction (RDR)
15 4.4 5.7 1.3
20 4.6 5.7 1.5
30 5.0 5.7 0.7
40 5.3 5.7 0.4
50 5.6 5.7 0.1
60 5.8 5.7 -0.1
The next column shows the actual real deficit in 1986. If the actual
deficit is subtracted from the financeable deficit, one arrives at the
Required Deficit Reduction (RDR).Thisis the reduction necessary for
consistency with thecorrespondinginflation rate.RDRequals1.1% for an
inflation target of 20%, but is essentially zero for a 50% inflation target.
In that sense, 50% can be considered as the equilibrium inflation rate, given
the 1986 fiscal stance and financial structure.
-
4.2Domestic Debt, Money Creation and the Trade-off between Current and
Future Inflation.
The previous Section discussed the fiscal adjustment necessary to achieve
a given inflation target. The same tables could be used to derive, instead,29
the inflation rate compatible with no fiscal adjustment, given the current
fiscal deficit.The current Section takes a different approach. What if
adjustment takes place, but not instantaneously? In particular, what happens
if the government pursues the monetary policy necessary to sustain a given
inflation rate, fails to make the required deficit reduction and covers the
resulting gap through debt issue? This in effect constitutes a debt
substitution policy, similar to the one that is discussed in the original
Sargent-Wallace (1982) paper. Consider a policy of strict adherence to
monetary policy consistent with inflation targets of say the 1987 rate of 20%.
Butinstead of making the required deficit reduction, the government issues
interest bearing debt to cover the remaining financing gap.
Monetization implies debt issue at zero nominal rate, so such a policy of
substituting interest bearing debt to replace revenue from monetization will
deteriorate the government's fiscal position. Figure 1 demonstrates the
consequences, The base line in the diagram (labeled "Adjustment now") shows
the inflation/deficit-reduction trade-off just discussed in Section 4.1. The
figure gives the amount of fiscal adjustment necessary (listed on the vertical
axis; the benchmark is 1986, in which year the real deficit was 5.7 percent of
GNP) for given inflation rates (listed on the horizontal axis). The line cuts
the axis at 50%, indicating that for that inflation target, the fiscal policy
stance in 1986 required no further adjustment.In that sense, 50% was
therefore the equilibrium inflation rate in that year.
The second line in the graph shows how the trade-off shifts in an
unfavorable direction if adjustment is postponed. The line, labeled
"Adj.after six years", shows the additional fiscal adjustment necessary, or,
alternatively, theincreasein equilibrium inflation if no adjustment is
taken. This line cuts the inflation axis at a rate in excess of 80 percent, an30







4.3 Fiscal Implications of Financial Sector Policies
Financial sector reforms are usually undertaken with microeconomic
efficiency as a predominating motivating factor.Advice to lower reserve
requirements is a good example. The objective is to lower the wedge between
lending and borrowing rates of the commercial banking system. Ac the same
time,such measures have a direct impact on aggregate demand for reserve
money and hence on the basis over which the inflation tax is levied. This in
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turn implies that they have implications for the fiscal deficit that is
consistent with inflation targets, or, alternatively, the inflation rate that
will prevail eventually if no fiscal adjustment takes place. A fiscal deficit
that was consistent with other macroeconomic targets before the reform may not
be consistent anymore once the reform has been implemented. The model
presented in this paper allows one to assess the need for fiscal policy
adjustment along with such reforms.
Typical experiments one can perform with the model would involve changes
in reserve requirements, decisions to pay interest rates on reserves, or
changes in bank interest rates. We will only consider changes in time deposit
rates here. The impact of deposit rate changes on demand for reserve money
depends intricately on the structure of private asset demand. For example
higher time deposit rates will lead to substitution out of cash into time
deposits, thus reducing demand for base money by the amount shifted times one
minus the reserve requirement ratio against time deposits; they will however
also trigger shifts out of non-monetary assets, with a positive impact on
reserve money demand since time deposits carry reserve requirements while
non-monetary assets do not. The net effect will depend on the relative
substitution effects, and on the level at which reserve requirements against
time deposits are set (cf van Wijnbergen (1982)). The empirical evidence
suggests that the second effect dominates, at least for the current level of
reserve requirements on time deposits (van Wijnbergen ( 1984) reports similar
results for South Korea).
Table 4 shows that currency and demand deposits will increase after a cut
in time deposit rates from 56 to 35 percent, but much less than time deposits
fall. Apparently, a cut in time deposit rates triggers a larger shift into
non-monetary assets than into currency in circulation or demand deposits. Thus32
base money demand declines. As a result, inflation tax revenues will decline
at any given inflation rate once monetary equilibrium is restored. As a
consequence, the required deficit reduction, "RDR", necessary to achieve a
target inflation rate of 35% increases from -0.9 percent of GNP to 1.1%.
TABLE 4 TIME DEPOSIT RATES AND BASE MONEY DEMAND
Time Deposit Rate: 0.56 0.35
Demand for:
Cash 3.1 3.7
Demand deposits 7.3 9.6
Time deposits 19.5 8.4
Total Base Money 7.1 6.4
Notes: Asset demands are expressed as a percentage of GNP;they
are evaluated at 35% inflation and a demand deposit rate
of 10%.
Alternatively, look at the inflation rate that will make any deficit
reduction unnecessary. Before the cut in deposit rates, this equilibrium
inflation rate (equilibrium, that is, for given inflation rate) equaled 50
percent, as we saw in Table 4. After the cut in interest rates this
equilibrium inflation rate increases to almost 85 percent. The large increase
in equilibrium inflation for such a small increase in RDR reflects the fact
that at inflation rates close to triple digits, money demand becomes highly
elastic. As a consequence, the additional revenue from higher inflation
declines rapidly as inflation itself rises. This necessitates bigger and33
bigger increases in inflation to cover a given increase in revenue
requirements as base level inflation increases. Changes in demand deposit
rates would have an even bigger impact, since demand deposits are close money
substitutes.
It is important to see such results in perspective. First, the parameter
values in the financial sector model are estimates only. Hence these results
should be considered as indicative of orders of magnitude only, rather than as
very precise point estimates. Second, they do not tell us whether financial
sector reform is desirable or not, but rather to what extent fiscal policy
adjustment is necessary to make a reform sustainable given macroeconomic
targets. Third and finally, we do not address the short term macroeconomic
effects of changes in demand for base money given the supply of base money.
With perfect capital mobility and a fixed exchange rate, capital inflows from
abroad will immediately resolve any discrepancy between money demand and money
supply. If capital mobility is less than perfect, however, such an increase of
base money demand over base money supply may have a recessionary impact until
price levels or reserve changes resolve any remaining imbalance between money
demand and supply.
4.4 External Debt, Foreign Interest Rates and Sustainable Inflation
In this section we report on two experiments. First, we show the impact
of foreign real interest rates, for a fixed level of foreign debt, on
sustainable inflation and the consistency of fiscal deficits with any given
inflation targets. We then analyse the consequences of "debt substitutioti"
repaying foreign debt not by running a matching domestic fiscal surplus, ( or
reduced deficit), but by the issue of additional domestic public sector debt.34
The latter policy has been pursued extensively in many LatinAmericandebtors
(Cohen ( 1987)).
Consider first the impact of real interest rates on public sector foreign
debt. Figure 2 summarizes the results. The first experiment is a hypothetical
return to the admittedly unsustainable late l970s with zero real interest
rates on foreign debt. The results are summarized by line RFOinFigure 2.
This line indicates that at a zero foreign real interest rate, no adjustment
is necessary for any (positive) inflation rate. If such a reduction in real
rates would take place, the financeable deficit would exceed the actual 1986
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The figure also shows the consequences of an increase in real interest
rates to 8 percent (the line labeled RF8 in figure 2). Clearly, suchan
increase in real interest rates, if sustained, wouldpush Turkey in
Latin-America level inflation rates if no additional fiscalmeasures were
taken. The intersection point shifts to 150 percent,indicating that the
equilibrium inflation rate more than doubles in that case. The figure also
shows another feature of the relation between fiscal policy and inflation.At
inflation rates substantially above 200%, the RDR line startssloping upward:
at rates that high, increased inflation requires more rather than less fiscal
adjustment. This is due to the fact that the maximum revenue from inflation
tax in Turkey is reached at somewhat above 200 percent inflationa year. At
higher inflation rates, the demand for base money declines so fast when
inflation rises, that total inflation tax revenue actually falls, thehigher
inflation rate notwithstanding. As a consequence, the RDR becomesa rising
rather than a declining function of inflation if the inflationrate exceeds
200 percent a year. We assume that the government followsmoney growth rules
that will keep the economy at the lower rather than thehigher rate
equilibrium.
Consider next the debt substitution experiment. Under this experiment,
the goverri.ment retires foreign debt equal to 10 percent of GNP and raises the
revenue by issuing an equivalent amount of interest bearing debt domestically.
This clearly deteriorates its fiscal position, since the real interest cost of
domestic debt is 6 percentage points higher (12instead of 6) than the cost
of foreign debt. Such a policy would increase the equilibrium inflation rate
to over 150% .Clearly,at current interest rate differentials, a policy of
retiring foreign public debt through issue of domestic debt will infact
deterioratethe fiscal position of the government.36
5 Conclusions
We have designed a simple framework for the assessment of the consistency
between fiscal policy and the requirements imposed by financial sector reform,
external debt and medium run inflation targets. The framework draws on the
public finance approach to inflation pioneered by Phelps (1973) and is
designed with practical application in mind. The approach has relatively
modest data requirements because of its focus on consistency rather than on
intertemporal optimality. The design of an intertemporally optimal fiscal
policy requires information about parameters such as the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, about which we do not even have ball park
estimates. Data requirements for application of the framework set up here do
not exceed routinely available financial sector and national accounts data.
Extra effort is required, however, in obtaining detailed information about the
regulatory framework for the financial sector and about the size of the actual
deficit of the public sector. The latter is defined in a comprehensive manner,
in particular inclusive of the Central Bank's profit and loss account.
We demonstrate the usefulness of the model by using it in an empirical
analysis of the implications of financial sector reform, inflation targets and
external debt strategies for fiscal policy in Turkey. The application
demonstrates, we hope, the usefulness of this approach for the analysis of the
interactions between external debt and foreign interest rates, domestic debt
servicing costs, fiscal policy and the sustainability of medium run inflation
targets. In addition, we applied the model to an analysis of the fiscal
implications of financial sector reform measures, showing the importance of
such measures for fiscal policy and the sustainability of medium run inflation
targets.37
Many extensions are possible. Introducing explicit dynamics in the
financial sector model would allow its use in year-to-year financial
programming. An even more ambitious extension would explicitly explore the
dynamics of inflation given the external debt and fiscal policy considerations
embedded in this approach, as is done in Sargent and Wallace (1982). This
would however require a much more substantial modeling effort, and would again
lead to much more demanding data requirements, thus jeopardizing empirical
applicability.
The model was designed to provide an easily applicable quantitative
framework, of potential use in different countries without requiring too much
of an effort for country-to-country transfer. We hope that the analysis of
Turkey presented here, apart from being of interest in its own right, also
demonstrates that the current version is a useful step in that direction.
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